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What is Steganography?
• Steganography is a practice of hiding a message (a.k.a. 
steganogram) in a legitimate carrier (a.k.a. cover 
object), so that no one suspects it exists. 
• the presence of the message is hidden.
• provides only security through obscurity
• Steganalysis
• In the digital steganography the cover object can be:
•text 
•image
•video file
•audio file
•other types of files
•network protocol header
•network flow
•file-system metadata 
•blockchains
•cyber-physical systems
•cryptographic protocols and 
schemes
•...
Etymology and Terminology
• Etymology: steganos (“covered”) +graphia (“writing”)
• first used by Johannes Trithemius (1462-1516)
• Terminology (Pfitzmann, 1996):
History
Histories (440 B.C) by Herodotus 
Human skin (499 BC, Histiaeus) 
Wax tablets (480 BC, Demaratus) 
Animal corpse
(6th century BC, 
Harpagus) 
Invisible ink
(280-220 BC, 
Philo of Byzantium)
(43 BC – 17/18 AD, Ovid) 
(23-79, Pliny the Elder)
...
Magiae Naturalis (1558) by 
Giambattista della Porta 
Eggshell
Astragal
(4th century BC, 
Aeneas Tacticus)
Music
Schola Steganographica
(1680) Gaspar Schott
Newspaper code
(between 17-19th century)
(1939-1945)
World War II, Germans
Microdots
Hypnerotomachia Poliphili
(1499) Francesco Colonna
Text steganography
(1550) 
Girolamo Cardano
Cardan grill
Linguistic 
steganography 
(16th century)
Cryptographic protocol
(subliminal channel)
(1984) Gustavus Simmons
Parchment
Vexierbild (1535) 
Erhard Schon 
Woodcut
Printouts
(end of the 20th
century)
(1970s)
invisible watermarks 
on pictures
Digital media files
(1999)
Anderson, Needham, 
Shamir
OS filesystem
(1978) Padlipsky, 
Snow, Karger
Network protocols
Code
(2004)  El-Khalil, 
Keromytis
Internet services
(21st century)  
IP telephony, 
Skype, BitTorrent
...
(2012)
Wendzel
Cyber-physical system
Wax ball, “la wan”
China
Classification of Digital Steganography
Taxonomy
Historical classification (Petitcolas et al., 1999)
Reproduced from (Petitcolas et al, 1999)
Steganography and Covert Channels
• Covert channels  
 those not intended for information transfer at all (Lampson, 1973)
 can be exploited by a process to transfer information in a manner that 
violates the systems security policy (DoD, 1985)
 when a process of a higher level can signal to a process of a lower level 
by affecting some shared resource (Anderson, 2008) - in the context of 
multi-level security
 time vs storage covert channels
 intentionality of the sender differs covert channels from side channels
• (Mazurczyk et al., 2016)
 The current distinction between two terms is artificial especially in a 
communication networks environment. 
 Network steganography techniques create covert channels for hidden 
communication, but such covert channels do not exist in communication 
networks without steganography.
Taxonomy
Image source with changes: (Cabaj et al, 2018)
The Prisoners’ Problem
Alice
Bob
Warden
• (Simmons, 1984)
• Passive warden – tries to detect the existence of the hidden 
communication (and content of the steganogram)
• Active warden – modifies the cover object to destroy or 
replace the steganogram, fabricates own cover objects 
(malicious warden)
Applications
• Legal vs illegal - traditionally
 Not quite good, since "legal" requires definition by some jurisdiction, and 
something which is legal under one jurisdiction may be illegal under another 
jurisdiction.
White hat applications
• Covert military communication in 
hostile environment
• Censorship circumvention
• Protection of journalists or whistle-
blowers, 
• Watermarking of network flows
• Secure network management 
communication  
• Providing QoS for VoIP traffic
• Tracking anonymous peer-to-peer 
VoIP calls 
Black hat applications
• Secret communication between 
terrorists and criminals
• Sharing of illegal material
• Industrial espionage  
• Sophisticated data leakages
• Malware (e.g., hiding C&C 
communications as in Fakem RAT)

(Cabaj et al, 2018) - real-world threats observed in the 2011 – 2017 
Network Steganography
• Network steganography describes the methods used for 
creating covert channels in communication networks 
(Mazurczyk et al., 2016)
• Carrier is one or more overt network flows.
• The best carriers must have two features:
1. they should be popular, so their utilization should not 
be considered as an anomaly.
2. modification of the carrier with the steganogram should 
not be “visible” to unaware third parties.
• If no traffic captured, nothing left for forensics analysis!
Why is Easy to use Network Flows as Carriers?
• Network protocols usually have:
 a random value fields
 an unused fields
 there is no strict rule how to obtain new values for some fields
 a feature that is not mandatory
 a feature that has dual nature, i.e. , the same feature can be 
obtained in more than one way
 ...
• Additionally, the communication channel is not perfect, so 
data can be embedded by mimicking usual errors and 
network anomalies (Zielinska et al., 2014).
• Steganography-free protocols are probably practically 
impossible to design, without limiting their functionality!!!
Research Challenge 1
• Build some automated checking tool, that will help protocol 
designers to create almost steganography-free protocols, 
by eliminating unnecessary redundancy and dealing with 
under-definition in network protocols.
Network Steganography
Hiding patterns
Image source with changes: (Mazurczyk et al. , 2016), (Wendzel et al., 2015)
Steganography + IoT
IoT Ecosystem
• Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) - integrations of computation with physical 
processes (Lee, 2008)
• smart homes and buildings, smart grid, autonomous cars, autopilot, 
industrial control systems, e-Health equipment, robotics system, etc.
Image source : (Salman et al. , 2017)
Smartphones Case
• Steganography in smartphones is studied a lot.
• All classes of digital steganography are present.
Image source : (Mazurczyk et al., 2014), Period: 2005-2014
Measured bandwidth 
between 0,22 and 3837
bps up to 2014!!!
(Mazurczyk et al., 2014)
Smartphones Case
Covert channels between colluding applications
• Smartphone OSs implement a permission-based security 
model (capability model).
• Use of local covert channels for Android-based devices
• Soundcomber (Schlegel et al, 2011)
• vibration settings, volume settings, screen state, file lock
Resource-constrained 
IoT Devices and Networks
• Many resource-constrained devices such as RFID tags, 
industrial controllers, sensor nodes and smart cards. 
 4-bit, 8-bit, 16-bit and 32-bit microcontrollers
 small ROM and RAM, e.g., TI COP912C - 768 B ROM, 64 B RAM
 small memory in RFID tags
 e.g., ISO RFID HF Tag with memory at least 128 B
• Low-Power Lossy Networks 
• data rates of order of 100 kbps and less, 
• high packet loss ( ~ 20%)
What can we do?
• Can we apply the network steganography?
Some IoT Protocols
CoAP
MQTT
XMPP
AMQP
SMQTT
DDS
IEEE 802.15.4
IEEE 802.11 AH
WirelessHART Z-Wave
Zigbee Smart Energy
Bluetooth Low Energy
DASH7
HomePlug
G.9959
LTE-A
LoRaWAN
Wightless
DECT/ULE
RPL
CORPL
CARP
6LoWPAN
6TiSCH
6Lo
IPv6 over G.9959
IPv6 over Bluetooth Low Energy
IEEE 1451
IEEE 1905.1
STOMP
CTP
LOAD
LOADng
E-CARP
TR-069
OMA-DM
LWM2M
TLS/DTLS
ISO/IEC/IEEE 18883
OAuth 2.0
SASL
ACE-OAuth
KNX
BACnet
COSE
OSCORE
Network Steganography in IoT
• Yes - easy to apply
Example 1 – Building Automation and Control Networking 
Protocol - BACnet (Wendzel et al., 2012)
• 2 storage and 1 timing covert channels
1.1 A Message-Type based storage covert channel
• Send Who-Is-Router-To-Network for binary 1
• Send I-Am-Router-To-Network for binary 0
1.2 A Parameter-based storage covert channel
• 16-bit DNET in the Who-Is-Router-To-Network 
1.3 A timing covert channel 
• with inter packet gaps
• Suggested protection: implementing multi-level security in 
BACnet firewall router (BFR) 
Network Steganography in IoT
Example 2 – Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol -
XMPP (RFC 6120, 6121), (Reshad et al., 2013)
2.1 Type Attribute-based storage covert channel
• case, presence/absence or value
2.2 id Attribute-based storage covert channel
• case or value
2.3 xml:lang Attribute-based storage covert channel
• presence/absence or value
2.4 Message body content-based  storage covert channel
• leading and trailing space redundancy, synonyms, spelling mistakes
Network Steganography in IoT
Example 3 – Constrained Application Protocol - CoAP 
(RFC 7252), (Mileva et al., 2018)
• 6 storage and 2 timing covert channels 
3 Storage covert channel using conditional requests 
If somebody knows for sure that given condition C1 is fulfilled (for 
example, the resource is created or deleted in previous message) 
and other C2 is not fulfilled, using either of If-Match and If-None-
Match options: 
• sending a given message without fulfilled condition to be binary 
1 (e.g., If-Match + C2), and 
• sending a given message with fulfilled condition (e.g., If-Match 
+ C1) to be binary 0. 
Network Steganography in IoT
Wireless Sensor Networks case,
covert channels independent from the used protocols 
Example 4 (Tuptuh et al., 2015)
• 2 covert channels 
4.1 Covert channel with modulation of transmission power
• which impacts the RSSI/LQI of a message
• experiments: Orisen nodes, with a user-selectable transmission 
power level that can range from -30 dBm to +4 dBm (power level 0 
to 18), giving ranges from about 50cm to around 70m outdoors.
• power level 18 – binary 0, while 17 – binary 1
• cover message encoded with Hamming (7, 4) + preamble bits
4.2 Storage covert channel with modulated sensor readings
• LSBs of encrypted sensor readings are the cover bits
• While (LSB  cover bit)
• add small offset to the sensor reading (e.g., temperature) 
• encrypt the value
Network Steganography in IoT
Covert channels on the physical layer 
that need a new pattern
Example 5
4.1 Covert channel with modulation of transmission power 
(Tuptuh et al., 2015)
5.1 Covert channel with Radio Frequencies – AirHopper (Guri
et al., 2014) 
5.2 Covert channel with Electromagnetic emission from USB–
USBee (Guri et al., 2016) 
One solution is to change the pattern Temperature into the 
pattern EM Emanation, because thermal radiation is a form of 
electromagnetic emanation!!! 
Steganography in the Applications above the 
Network Protocols
Wearables case 
• (Denney et al., 2016) A novel storage covert channel that 
sends data to other applications, through the use of 
notifications that are normally displayed on the status bar 
of an Android device.
• A notification listening service on the wearables needs to 
be implemented. 
• Notifications can be shared across multiple devices
• Data are hidden in the 32-bit notification ID numbers 
• Their exchange with notify and cancel functions. 
• If notifying function is immediately followed by the canceling 
function, the notification is never displayed to the user although it 
can be seen in the log files, so the communication is hidden from 
the user that wear the device.
What can we do?
• Can we apply the network steganography?
Yes
• Can we apply the cryptosystem steganography?
Cryptosystem Steganography in IoT 
• Security in IoT
• TLS/DTL, OAuth 2.0, SASL, ACE-OAuth, ISO/IEC/IEEE 18883:2016, 
OSCORE, COSE...
• Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format 
designed for small code size and small message size. 
• Most relevant security IETF standards or drafts for IoT:
• COSE (CBOR Object Signing & Encryption) – RFC 8152
• ACE-OAuth (Authorization and Authentication in Constrained 
Environments using the OAuth 2.0) - draft
• OSCORE (Object Security for CORE) - draft
• Known subliminal channels in signature algorithms: DSA, 
ECDSA, EdDSA, ElGammal, RSA, etc. 
• Suggested subliminal-free versions for DSA and ECDSA
• not used in practice?
Cryptosystem Steganography in IoT 
• TLS/DTLS uses RSA, DSA, ECDSA and EdDSA (in v1.3) 
• CoAP is secured using DTLS over UDP. 
• Recommendation: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
• Authentication SASL mechanisms supports RSA, DSA and
ECDSA as signature algorithms.
• COSE uses ECDSA and EdDSA
Research Challenge 2
• Examine new IoT security solutions (standards and draft 
versions) for existence of novel subliminal channels, or 
other novel covert channels.
What can we do?
• Can we apply the network steganography?
Yes
• Can we apply the cryptosystem steganography?
Yes
• Can we secretly store data in the CPSs? 
CPS - Building Automation Systems 
secret data storage
• (Wendzel et al., 2017) - one can places hidden data in the CPS 
environment by slightly modifying some of its components.
• Actuators, sensors, controllers, and monitoring equipment
• Scenario – two agents use the airport BAS 
Two approaches:
1. utilization of unused registers – trivial
 e.g., temperature sensor Used Maxim Integrated Products, Inc., 1-Wire 
DS18B20 with two 8-bit alarm registers (min/max temperature) and 0x4b46 
default value, 
 accept values between –55 and +125°C  not all 8 bits can be utilized 
 serial numbers of sensors can be used for sort hiding data in several 
components
CPS - Building Automation Systems
secret data storage
2. modulation of actuator states
 actuator states change and influence the physical environment, i.e. steganographic 
operations may not be robust and be easily detectable and thus need a reasonable 
storage strategy
 BACnet (ISO standard 16484-5:2014)
 BACnet devices typically allow to store between 1 and 16 bits per present value 
property. 
e.g., heating value
of 80% binary “0”
of 79% binary “1”
Image source: (Wendzel et al., 2017)
Small amount of 
data stored
within a single 
smart building!!!
Research Challenge 3
• Examine the secret data storage capacity and possibilities 
of other CPSs, e.g., autonomous cars and e-Health 
equipment.
• These CPSs are of special type, because they are mobile 
and can be moved by people from one place to another!!!
Image source with changes: (Mazurczyk et al. , 2016)
What can we do?
• Can we apply the network steganography?
Yes
• Can we apply the cryptosystem steganography?
Yes
• Can we secretly store data in the CPSs? 
Yes
• Can we apply the filesystem steganography?
Filesystem Steganography in IoT 
• IoT OSs
• RIOT OS, Microsoft Windows 10 for IoT, WindRiver VxWorks, Google 
Brillo, ARM Mbed OS, Embedded Apple iOS, Nucleus RTOS, ...
• Potentially, it can be used in IoT devices with embedded 
multiple-time programmable non-volatile memory, 
embedded Flash memory, external Flash memory, eMMC 
memory, or similar. 
What can we do?
• Can we apply the network steganography?
Yes
• Can we apply the cryptosystem steganography?
Yes
• Can we secretly store data in the CPSs? 
Yes
• Can we apply the filesystem steganography?
Promising
• Can we use steganography for securing IoT?
Securing IoT Devices using Steganography
• Not successful yet!!!
• e.g. (Yin et al., 2015)
• Scenario: image face recognition for authentication in 
smart homes with IP camera for unlocking doors. 
• with eavesdropping of home LAN, the attacker will obtain the image
• Idea: IP camera takes the picture of the resident, and 
hides it in other image, by some steganographic method
• Stego image is sent to the authentication server
• Many problems!!!
• e.g., Replay attacks
• Cannot replace cryptography with steganography in IoT!!!
• Also, similar problems with suggested solutions that 
combine steganography and cryptography.
Securing IoT Devices using Steganography
• (Islam et al., 2017)
• Authenticating geolocation of IoT devices – important
• Device relocation can be an attack
• Uses ICMP covert channels for authenticating Internet 
packet routers as an intermediate step towards proximal 
geolocation of IoT devices.
• Inherited weaknesses of IP-based geolocation techniques
• many Internet clients may stay behind proxies or firewalls, so, any 
external network searching for a client IP address may actually find 
a proxy, which may be erroneous for location mapping.
What can we do?
• Can we apply the network steganography?
Yes
• Can we apply the cryptosystem steganography?
Yes
• Can we secretly store data in the CPSs? 
Yes
• Can we apply the filesystem steganography?
Promising
• Can we use steganography for securing IoT?
Not successful yet
What about Steganalysis?
• Steganalysis is much more difficult than 
steganography!!!
• The existing solutions, like traffic normalizers 
and similar active wardens, can be applied for 
IoT case, also.
• In steganography, proactive solutions are more 
promising than reactive.
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